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This study deals with the impact of ocean shipping trends
on the merchant fleet's ability to adequately fulfill its
mission of providing a military auxiliary that is substantial
enough to meet its role in the defense of the nation. After
a brief history of the U.S. merchant fleet, trends in mer-
chant ship technology, size and type are identified. Using
these trends, a profile of future merchant ship type and
manpower availability is presented. The manpower and ship
types which the military would require of the merchant fleet
in time of conflict are identified. Program action options
to meet manning and shipping requirements are presented.
The study concludes that the future U.S. merchant fleet will
be unable to totally fulfill its military support require-
ments for manning or shipping.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
The United States (U.S.) Shipping industury is a promi-
nent element of both the U.S. economy and U.S. defense.
During a time of military conflict, the U.S. merchant fleet
would be required to provide the greatest proportion of the
vessels and manpower for the overseas shipment of cargo.
The ability of the merchant fleet to adequately fulfill its
mission of providing a military auxiliary that is substan-
tial enough to fulfill its role in the defense of the nation
is currently under question. The United States commercial
shipping industry has been in a constant state of decline
since World War (WW) II [Ref. l:p. 9]. Mr. R. E. Casey,
President, American Merchant Marine Institute, Inc., ob-
serves that, "Our active fleet is too small and too old to
effectively serve U.S. economic interests, quiet aside from
the national defense aspects." [Ref. 2:p. 12] Ship tech-
nology, size and type greatly impact on the available man-
power and military usefulness of the ships in the merchant
fleet. Projections of trends in these areas are therefore
of great concern to military planners.
B. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
From a military viewpoint, the decreases in the merchant
fleet and the resulting manpower losses are a threat to the
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security of the nation. If this trend of decline in commer-
cial shipping continues, manning and shipping alternatives
must be sought. Future trends which may help the merchant
fleet regain its maritime commercial prominence could have
a further negative impact on the fleet's defense usefulness.
C. RESEARCH QUESTION
What impact will ocean shipping trends have on the mer-
chant fleet's ability to meet its military support
requirements?
D. METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY
World wide maritime data was compiled from library re-
search for the purposes of this study. This information was
combined with military statistics and requirements. The
study identified the most probable trends in commercial
ocean shipping through the 1990s, assembles a forecast of
the composition of the future merchant fleet, assesses fu-
Navy support program manpower and shipping requirements, and
evaluates the impact of future trends on the merchant fleet's
ability to meet these requirements. Possible alternatives




Chapter II provides a brief overview of the history of
the merchant marine fleet. Chapter III looks at the com-
mercial ocean shippint trends in ship technology, size, and
type. The military support manning and ship type require-
ments are stated in Chapter IV along with projections of the
merchant fleet's ability to meet these requirements. Chap-
ter V presents alternatives available for providing adequate
manning and shipping. Chapter VI presents the conclusions
of the study and recommendations.
II. HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE
UNITED STATES MERCHANT MARINE
A. INTRODUCTION
The United States shipping industry has been in contin-
uous decline over the past century with the reasons for that
decline woven through a complex web of historical events,
world economic conditions and consistently flawed governmen-
tal attempts to make U.S. shipping competitive in the world.
Due to its importance in the defense of America the merchant
marine fleet has often been called the Fourth Arm of Defense
of the United States. To quote Admiral James Holloway, U.S.
Navy (Ret.) and President of the Council of American-Flag
Ship Operators; "Unless the United States goes to war with
Mexico or Canada - a rather unlikely turn of events - the
United States Merchant Marine is going to play a critical
role in any future conflict involving the United States."
[Ref. 3:p. 44] In order to understand the current state of
the merchant marine force and be able to predict affects of
future shipping trends on the force with some degree of ac-
curacy one needs to be aware of the history of the merchant
marine fleet and what factors have effected it in the past.
This chapter is a summary of that history.
B. GROWTH OF THE U.S. MERCHANT MARINE: 1789-1850
From the earliest times even the mere presence of a
formidable fleet was viewed as an aid in the defense of any
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country. Whoever could rule the seas could rule the world.
The ships of the economy and the defense were perceived to
be one and the same. There was vigorous growth for American
shipping and the shipbuilding industry during the period be-
tween the American Revolution and the Civil war. The first
English colonial settlers came to America on ships. From
those earliest days in the development of the nation, the
sea became an economic mainstay of life in the colonies.
The necessity of maintaining a strong merchant marine was
recognized from the earliest days of the nation and by the
earliest government. Maintaining an adequate supply of U.S.
ships could insure that essential trade routes would not be
subject to the whims of other foreign vessels which might
be unreliable.
Early government intervention resulted in the inclusion
of a provision in the Constitution that international and
interstate trade would be regulated by the national govern-
ment. One of the initial steps taken by the first Congress
to support this responsibility was the passage of the Tariff
Act of 1789. This bill provided import tax incentives for
all shippers to ship their goods on American vessels. It
also encouraged the ownership of U.S. -built vessels by
charging less in U.S. port entry fees to U.S. -built and
registered ships. This tended to encourage participation of
only U. S. -registered ships in the U.S. coastal trade. In
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1817, Congress formally closed U.S. coastal trading to for-
eign trading [Ref. 4:pp. 51-52].
Thanks to abundant, easily accessible timber along the
eastern seaboard the U.S. gradually became pre-eminent in
the building of wooden ships. American ships were the best
constructed and most durable in the world. With a virtually
unlimited supply of wood for vessels, American shipbuilding
flourished. During this period the U.S. merchant fleet grew
to a position of prominence [Ref. 5:pp. 7-8]. Costs of
American built ships were low and by 1790 U.S. ships carried
almost ninety percent of the nation's exports and imports.
Until the early 1800s the U.S. transported over 80 percent
of its goods through its own flag ships [Ref. 4:p. 53].
C. BEGINNING OF THE DECLINE: 1850s - CIVIL WAR
Emerging technologies quicJcly cast the course of inter-
national dominance. The early 1800s saw the introduction
of the iron steamship. Instead of moving to the forefront
of the new technology, the U.S. chose to improve on the
wooden ships and developed the sleeJc hulled clipper ships
of the 1840s. Up until this point in history, American
flag ships had been favored by the superior carrying capac-
ity, speed and seaworthiness of American ships. The use of
iron, steel and steampower proved to be superior for ship-
ping and this change in technology (the replacement of wood
by iron and steel in the shipbuilding craft) resulted in
U.S. flag ships losing their competitive edge.
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Political events were the next to greatly alter the U.S.
shipping industry as the Civil War caused massive destruction
of the nation's ships. The North and South decimated each
other's vessels in an attempt to interdict shipping. Mer-
chants of American and foreign countries were afraid to ship
their goods in American ships because of these attacks. U.S.
shipowners, in an attempt to avoid complete financial de-
struction, sold off many of their assets to foreign shipown-
ers. As much as one third of the merchant fleet was sold
during the four years of the Civil War [Ref. 4:p. 57]. By
1866 only 32 percent of American trade was carried in American
ships [Ref. 4:p. 58]
After the war the U.S. fleet continued to decline. Wood
was easily accessible to the U.S. shipbuilders whereas steel
was not. The cost of U.S. steel was much higher than that
of European steel. As a result, American steel-built ships
(when they were finally built) cost forty to seventy-five
percent more than the European vessel. U.S. investors looked
to foreign-built vessels and foreign registration [Ref. 4:
pp. 56-58].
The decline during the period from 1850 to 1926 was so
drastic that there were times when the American merchant
fleet completely disappeared from the seas. In 1850, Ameri-
can ships carried between seventy-two and seventy-three per-
cent of the nation's foreign commerce. By 1900, this figure
was ten percent and by 1910 it had dropped to 8.7 percent
(Ref. 6:p. 20].
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This trend continued up until World War (WW) I with the
result that the United States had virtually no merchant ma-
rine at the outbreak of the war. Needed as a military aux-
iliary, the Shipping Act of 1916 gave temporary authority
for civilian and governmental purchase or lease of foreign
ships in order to offset the wartime U.S. shortages. This
act spurred a surge in ship construction, resulting in the
mass production of over 2,000 units, one-third of which were
not completed before the war was over [Ref. 7:p. 5].
D. WORLD WAR I -WORLD WAR II
During WWI there was great incentive to rebuild the mer-
chant fleet and to man it. The Navy relied on the merchant
fleet to carry cargo that was required to insure victory.
The war brought to light the weaknesses of the merchant ma-
rine force and their importance in the defense effort. Sev-
eral government policies and regulations were passed in an
effort to strengthen the force. These policies and regula-
tions still impact on today's merchant fleet. The Seaman's
Act of 1915 increased the standards of working and safety
for seamen serving on U.S. flag vessels. It strengthened
the seafaring unions and laid the initial requirements for
use of higher-cost American crews. The Merchant Marine Act
of 1916, as previously mentioned, resulted in a large govern-
ment-owned fleet of which many were unfit as commercial
vessels.
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The government then had the problem as to what to do with
this fleet after the war ended. The Merchant Marine Act of
1920 was passed to deal with this problem. It had two ob-
jectives: to provide for the transfer of the fleet of ships
to private hands; and secondly, to establish a framework in
which the fleet could operate profitably under private
management. [Ref. 5:pp. 12-13]
Congress declared in Section 1 of the 1920 Act:
. . . That it is necessary for the national defense and
for the proper growth of its foreign and domestic com-
merce that the United States shall have a merchant ma-
rine of the best equipped and most suitable types of
vessels sufficient to carry the greater portion of its
commerce and serve as a naval or military auxiliary in
time of war or national emergency ultimately to be
owned and operated privately by citizens of the United
States; and it is hereby declared to be the policy of
the United States to do whatever may be necessary to
develop and encourage the maintenance of such a mer-
chant marine, and, insofar as may not be inconsistent
with the express provisions of the Act, the United
States Shipping Board shall, in the disposition of
vessels and shipping property as hereinafter provided,
in the making of rules and regualtions, and in the
administration of the shipping law always in view
this purpose and object as the primary end to be
obtained. [Ref. 7:p. 5]
Although modified by the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 by
substituting the word "substantial" for "greater" in the
phrase "the greater portion of its commerce," this policy
remains the basis for national maritime policy even today.
This legislation represented a new and costly approach to
the ills of the maritime industry. Direct subsidies were
granted in the forms of construction and operating differen-
tials to increase the number of ships built in American
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shipyards, to provide jobs and high wages for merchant sea-
men caught in the jaws of the Depression and to insure a
capable merchant fleet as part of the national defense program,
With the surplus of ships after WWI, carriage of U.S.
foreign trade reached a high of fifty-one percent during the
early 1920s. That share was not maintained and, except for
World War II, has declined steadily. By 1933, the U.S. flag
share had fallen to thirty- three percent [Ref. 5:p. 14].
Despite this sufficient number of ships to handle commercial
peacetime use, the U.S. transportation industry once again
found itself with an insufficient number of ships to handle
the role required of it when the U.S. became involved in WW
II. Many of the ships that were available were destroyed
early on and the country embarked on another around-the-
clock building program. Between the years 1940 and 1945,
U.S. yards built "5037 merchant vessels of 2,000 gross tons
and over." [Ref. 8:p. 53]
WW II is the first time that manpower shortages are re-
corded for U.S. vessels. The maritime industry had been
declining since WW I and the increased need for sailors dur-
ing WW II quickly outstripped the number of trained sailors
available. The manpower shortage continued to exist until
the end of the war. Before the war began, there were ap-
proximately 60,000 men and officers serving in the U.S. mer-
chant marine [Ref. 9:p. 195]. At the beginning of the war,
the merchant marine suffered heavy casualties. Six months
16
into the conflict, 350 ships with over 3,000 merchant sea-
men on board were lost. Recruiting and training programs
were quickly established but the manning gap was never closed
during the war. [Ref. 9:p. 199]
At the close of WW II, the government again found itself
faced with a surplus of ships. The Merchant Ship Sales Act
of 1946 allowed the government to sell off 2,000 of its
4,500 merchant ships [Ref. 2:p. 17]. These ships were sold
to American flag operators and to foreign flags, primarily
England, Norway, and France. About 1,400 of the remaining
ships were relegated to the National Defense Reserve Fleet
(NDRF). The U.S. merchant fleet fell baclc into a period of
decline due to too many ships being available worldwide.
With a lacl<: of trade to support them the number of ships be-
gan to decline and, correspondingly, the number of jobs
available to merchant seamen.
E. AFTER WW II: A PERIOD OF FURTHER DECLINE
After WW II foreign nations committed vast resources to
developing new merchant marine fleets. The U.S., by con-
trast, had little incentive for heavy investment while it
was operating large numbers of warbuilt ships. The commit-
ment of foreign nations to their merchant fleet still exists
and continues to give them an edge over the U.S. in the
areas of technology and advanced design. These two factors
allow them to operate more efficiently and with smaller
crews and continue to offer better rates to shippers.
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Additional problems were caused due to this lack of com-
mitment. Without shipbuilding investments corresponding to
trade needs, the U.S. became increasingly dependent on for-
eign flag ships to transport oil and bulk raw materials for
the nation's industries. This shortage of the right type of
vessels also left the U.S. unable to compete for foreign
trade [Ref. 10:p. 20]. One way that the U.S. shippers did
attempt to be competitive was by holding down their capital
acquisition costs for as long as possible. Because of the
expense involved in purchasing new ships, American companies
would maintain old steam-driven inefficient vessels while
the rest of the world maritime community was moving to big-
ger, more energy efficient, diesel vessels. This placed the
U.S. industry even further behind. With the decline of the
merchant fleet, the fleet's ability to meet its military
support program missions continued to decline.
In 1965 the Vietnam conflict renewed the demand for
shipping. Ninety-eight percent of the military cargoes de-
ployed to Vietnam were deployed by ship [Ref. 4:p. 92].
Plentiful job opportunities ashore and high wages coupled
with the uncertain future of a career at sea contributed to
the large number of unfilled seagoing billets. This short-
age of skilled marine engineers, deck officers, and skilled
seamen in all ratings delayed many of the military cargo
sailings.
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As a result, in 1969, 135 NDRF sailings experienced a
cumulative delay of 649 days or 4.8 days per ship. In 1967
and 1968 there were a total of 201 delayed sailings for an
average of 3.4 days per ship [Ref. ll:p. 12]. In addition
to delays in sailing times, many ships had to sail short-
handed. Based on operating costs of from $2,700 to $3,500
per day, it is estimated that $7,089,400 additional costs
were incurred due to these sailing delays [Ref. 12]. Another
contributing factor to these shortages was the age of the
ships. The technology was old and the seamen who can oper-
ate this technology were no longer available as a result of
attrition.
The positive effect of the Vietnam Conflict was that it
held off the forecasted shrinlcing of the merchant fleet. A
downward trend which had existed since WW II was stalled,
for a short time. Although the merchant fleet had been un-
able to totally fulfill its support mission a more severe
decline was temporarily prevented.
F. THE 1980s
The trend in the 1980s continued to be a slow decline
in the number of vessels. With the inauguration of Presi-
dent Reagan in January of 1981, there had been a new sense
of optimism in the maritime industry . The Reagan Administra-
tion appeared to be dedicated to a strong national defense
and a correspondingly strong merchant marine. While the
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Reagan Administration on one hand favored the construction
of a 600-ship navy and undertook measures to begin such a
program, it was likewise faced with the problem of a growing
deficit and pressure to reduce government spending. The
merchant marine industry was to feel the results of these
pressures.
Beginning with Fiscal Year (FY) 1982, the Reagan Admin-
istration cut construction subsidy funds from the budget.
The purposes of these funds had been to help American ship-
builders hold their costs down in order to be competitive
with the cheaper foreign shipbuilders. The Reagan Admini-
stration requested 15% less for maritime programs in FY 84
than they requested in FY 1983 [Ref. 10:p. 20]. Government
assistance in the form of direct subsidies has been discon-
tinued. The number of American flag ships continue to de-
cline while their age continues to increase.
Even though the number of ships continues to decline,
the amount of deadweight tonnage has remained fairly con-
stant. The trend has been towards larger ships thus capi-
talizing on economies of scale. The new larger ships are
also more technically advanced and require smaller crews.
U.S. flag operator who used to require 35 to 40 people to
man their ships now only require 21 or 22 men [Ref. 13:p. 65].
Because of this, seafaring jobs continue to disappear from
the U.S. maritime industry and the ability of the fleet to
meet its military manning support requirements is in jeopardy.
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The current crisis seems to be the result of both short-
term imbalances between demand and supply and of the long-
term accumulation of aged outmoded ships. Government support
in the form of any type of subsidies does not seem probable
with the current emphasis on decreasing the budget deficit.
This Administration believes in competition as the solution
to the merchant marine ills.
The most recent development as of October 1986 is the
possibility that the Navy may begin shipping its multimillion-
dollar international business aboard foreign vessels. Saying
that American commercial ships charge too much. Pentagon
officials have proposed easing the restrictions of a 1904
law which gives U.S. shippers first option on carrying all
U.S. military goods. The U.S. merchant fleet has countered
by saying the fleet's demise would be hurried by losing what
they claim to be the largest single source of cargo in the
world. The U.S. shippers also warn that the demise of the
merchant fleet could weaken the Navy itself which turns to
merchant ships in times of war.
Under the newly proposed rule, the Secretary of the Navy--
represented by cost-cutting Pentagon contracting officers--
would have a wider berth in deciding whether U.S. shippers
were priced unfairly. The 1904 law "does not grant the U.S.
flag carriers a right to have the government subsidize in-
efficiency or inappropriate pricing," the Defense Department
wrote in the July 28 "Federal Register." The 1904 Act was
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specifically passed to keep the merchant fleet afloat during
peacetime so that it could meet its wartime requirements
when called upon. Currently, the only circumstances where
U.S. military cargo can be shifted to foreign flag vessels
is when the shippers are charging "excessive or otherwise
unreasonable tariffs." [Ref. 14]
G. SUMMARY
Even before it was legislated to do so, the merchant
fleet served as a defense auxiliary in time of war. With
over 90% of any future military wartime cargo expected to
be moved over the ocean, the merchant fleet will maintain a
position of importance in the defense of the U.S. The mari-
time industry has shown the effects of technology, world
events, and a fluctuating economy. Its history suggests
that only in times of war does the government become truly
interested in improving the merchant fleet. The lack of
concern has led to the current decrease in ships, decrease
in merchant seamen, decrease in the number of jobs available
to the mariners and an overall decline of the American mer-
chant fleet. The current state of affairs makes the assess-
ment of future trends even more important in future military
planning.
22
III. OCEAN SHIPPING TRENDS
A. INTRODUCTION
Forecasting commercial shipping trends is difficult but
necessary for informed action by the military users of the
merchant fleet. Certain trends in ship technology, size and
type will have a great impact on the composition of the fu-
ture U.S. merchant fleet and the fleet's ability to provide
future military support. This chapter will examine the ma-
jor commercial trends to the year 2000 that would affect the
military usefulness of the merchant fleet.
B. FUTURE TRENDS IN SHIP TECHNOLOGY
The greatest manpower availability impact will be a re-
sult of increasing technological advancements. Jobs which
were once done by humans will be automated or computerized.
World ocean-borne trade, which has grown at an average rate
of 7.4% since 1950, will continue to grow through the year
2000 and this growth in trade will require a parallel growth
in total shipping capacity [Ref. 15:pp. 1-3]. Because of
technological advances, an increase in shipping capacity




Automation of shipboard duties has caused a great
decrease in the number of jobs available to the merchant
seaman. This trend is projected to continue through the
year 2000. The promise of crew costs savings has been a ma-
jor factor in the introduction of ship board automation.
Crew costs represent one of the larger variables among mari-
time nations. One estimate places U.S. wage costs at six
times that of a Chinese crew. Table I shows Great Britain
and Singapore with .39:1 and .16:1 crew cost ratios respec-
tively when compared to American crew costs.
TABLE I
TYPICAL CONTAINERSHIP ANNUAL CREW COSTS,
UNITED STATES AND FOREIGN MANNING, 1983
Crew Nationality
_Costs y^it?^_§^?^??__yDit?^_^i02^9!]}__§i{}3?P9?!?
Wages (Dollars) 3,780,000 1,433,000 570,000
Subsistence (Dollars) 124,000 82,000 53,000
Ratio to U.S. 1.00 0.39 0.16
SOURCE: Maritime Administration
Wages on U.S. flag vessels account for 20 to 50 per-
cent of total operating costs [Ref. 17: p. 4]. The high U.S.
standard of living is the major factor in the higher wage
requirements. The maritime industry has become highly union-
ized and safety requirements combined with union wage re-
quirements have driven crew costs extremely high [Ref. 18:
p. 66]. To become competitive with the other world shippers
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U.S. flag operators must find ways to cut their costs and
attract customers. Automated engine rooms and bridge control
have already been introducted into newer ships and shipboard
automation is anticipated to be extended to other areas.
A second purpose of ship automation is the improve-
ment of efficiency and reliability of shipboard equipment.
Computers are already able to monitor fuel requirements and
engine room requirements more accurately than previous human
calculations. Introduction of automatic equipment will be
accompanied by a rationalization of shipboard work and the
use of centralized controls to result in a complete reorgan-
ization of the ship crew. Although labor unions may be ex-
pected to resist any reduction in crew size, economic
pressures have already shown that a larger number of jobs
will be lost if the present state of decline continues.
Unions will have little to gain if U.S. shipowners go out of
business or turn to foreign crews for manning.
Trends to date have primarily focused on reduction
of operational functions like engine room watch-keeping and
engine bridge control. These have enabled enough crew re-
duction that ships which formerly required 50 men crews may
now be manned by as few as 30 to 35 men. In the future,
the trend will be towards instrumentation process control
and on line monitoring systems, which will enable large im-
provements on reliability and reductions in the size of the
shipboard maintenance force. [Ref. 19:pp. 1-11]
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As the trend towards reduction in crew size continues,
one possible result may be the unmanned "slave" ship. In
this case, a lead ship with some crew aboard could control a
fleet of "slave" ships by radio. These ships would be main-
tained through periodic visits by helicopter from the lead
ship. Some imaginative marine experts are asking if it is
necessary for a freighter to waste time going into port at
all? They envision nuclear powered cargo ships of enormous
size that will remain at sea for years at a time. Cargo,
supplies, and crews would be transferred by giant helicopters
as ships sail along the cost. [Ref. 20:p. 341]
In his book. The Future of Ships , D. Phillips-Birt
raises the question of the human problem as crews become
smaller and smaller:
One might envisage as the approaching ideal, after
studying the mass of the electronic navigational
equipment on display, ships exceeding 400,000 tons
under the control of one man lolling before a
bridge console pressing a button from time to time.
Then there will be the last button of all which,
unpressed and by some super-sensitive means, will
issue the warning (to whom is uncertain; perhaps
to the owners a few thousand miles away on shore)
that the man has died at his post or gone mad;
while the ship sails on cool as a Zombie, directed
by its icy computer mind, automatically steered,
course automatically plotting itself, automatically
early-warned of collision, making pre-planned changes
of course, fully programmed to meet all emergencies,
including the last great adventure of meeting its
maker. [Ref. 21:p. 78]
Another possibility Phillips-Birt states is that
ships may become totally controlled from the shore. Whether
the trend towards crew reduction results only in a certain
26
percentage of reduction or total reduction, the writer agrees
that the trend in crew reduction will continue for reasons of
reducing crew costs and making operations more efficient.
2. Propulsion
Propulsion advancements will impact on the size and
type of ships to become commercially prominent. At the pres-
ent, virtually all large commercial ships are propelled by
either diesel or steam turbine power plants. These two types
of prime movers are anticipated to make accelerated improve-
ments because of their competitive field and the appearance
of competitive gas turbine and nuclear plant concepts.
The turn of the century offers great promise for
nuclear propulsion. Nuclear propulsion plants on board
ships offer several advantages that make them desireable as
the size and speed of ships increases. The size, weight and
cost of a nuclear reactor does not increase proportionately
with their power output, the cost of supplying conventional
fuel is saved over the lifetime of the ship, gone is the
need for frequent, time consuming fuel replenishments, and
the weight from the lesser weight of the nuclear plant saved
could be used to carry more cargo [Ref. 22:p. 156]. At
present, the high initial capital cost of the nuclear plant
is the block to its widespread use. This economic gap is
anticipated to narrow and low cost, light weight, nuclear
plants will secure an increasing share of the commercial
market in the future [Ref. 19:pp. 1-110].
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One reason for the slow adaptation to nuclear power
is the fact that propulsion systems are intimately linked
to the vessels in which they are installed. It is not mere-
ly the act of replacing one power plant with another. The
ship must be designed and built to the specifications of a
nuclear powered vessel. As the existing fleet ages and is
replaced, it will then become more economical to the ship





Although some innovative hull types like the new
dynamic lift surface vessel which the Navy is experimenting
with [Ref. 23] occasionally make headlines, the basic mono-
hull type presently used by the commercial shipping industry
is not expected to change and will still dominate the ship-
ping industry at the turn of the century. A continuous
stream of refinements in theory and design are expected for
the monohull for improvements in such operational features
as vibratory and sea keeping behavior. This will allow for
much larger vessels to be built. Trends in ship size are
covered in more detail in the next section.
4. Cargo Handling
Advancements in cargo handling will encourage ship-
owners to discontinue the use of the more militarily useful
older break-bulk style self sustaining vessel. The break-
bulk vessel is characterized by its large hold and its own
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on/off loading capability. Although reliable, the cargo
handling procedures of this ship type are relatively slow
compared to the more modern container ships. Conventional
shore-based dry bulk cargo handling facilities will be sup-
plemented by specialized high-rate shipboard conveyor systems
which will be equipeed to handle containerized (unitized)
cargo.
The trend toward unitization of all non-bulk dry
cargo by the year 2003 is anticipated. This will result in
a further need for containerships and less need for the
break-bulk ship. The unitization of cargo will allow for
mechanized handling, which will be automated at all major
terminals. Port times of less than half a day will be man-
datory in view of air-freight competition and the increased
speed of nuclear powered ships [Refs. 18, 19:p. 31, 3-3].
The increased speed and specialization of commercial cargo
is positive from the cost and time saving aspect needed by
the U.S. shipping industry to become more price competitive.
Port costs will be decreased and cargo crew handling costs
will be minimized at the expense of reducing one type of
ship which has been found to be very useful in the carriage
of military cargo.
5. Navigational Aids
By the year 2000 we can expect the complete auto-
mation of navigator duties through the use of computers
linked to the navigational system. Although this will,
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again, offer crew cost savings for the commercial shipowner,
it will decrease the number of jobs available to the mer-
chant mariner. The older vessels of the Ready Reserve Force
which would be activated in time of crisis would not be
equipped with the newest navigational aids available and
merchant mariners with navigation skills would be required
to man the vessels.
On board the newer commercial vessels automated
lookout and proximity warning devices will correct bearing
and speed. Computers will link the navigational aids to the
propulsion system. The result could be the ability to have
shore control of an unmanned ship. Satellites could ob-
viously be designed to provide a radar picture of the oceans
of the world and information about the surface and weather
conditions over the ocean [Ref. 24:p. 39]. Approaching bad
weather systems could be routed around and combined with
the least-time route without the aid of any crew onboard
[Ref. 21;p. 162].
B. FUTURE TRENDS IN SHIP SIZE
An increase in ship size will offer a unique challenge
to the military as bigger and better but fewer ships com-
pose the future fleet. With increasingly powerful means of
propulsion and improved monohull design anticipated the only
limits on the size of vessels appear to be navigational and
economical. [Ref. 19:pp. 1-3] There is a definite trend
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to larger sizes of vessels to take advantage of economies of
scale with the result being an increase in the total ship-
ping capacity but a slower growth in the total number of
ships available [Ref. 25:p. 201],
The increase in cargo handling speed will increase the
potential to have larger ships as the required port time and
handling costs are kept low. Additionally the increased
automation of ships and the fewer number of crew members re-
quired due to that automation have added even further to the
economies of scale [Ref. 19:p. 62].
The navigation question for ships as they grow larger
is an important one for the military. The size of a ship
limits the ports that the ship is able to enter and the
ability of the ships to come closer to the land. Wartime
circumstances may make it necessary for ships to berth in
areas that have limited or no port facilities available.
The safety of larger ships is also at question. Al-
though no major increase in the future speed of ships is
anticipated, the time and sea room necessary for stopping
and simple maneuvers of such large vessels could cause con-
cern. Despite this factor the trend for larger ships is
projected to continue until the benefits received level out
at some future optimal ship size that has not yet been de-
termined. The military must be aware of and plan for this
increase in the size of the vessels that they hope to
utilize.
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C. FUTURE TRENDS IN SHIP TYPE
What type of ship will the future merchant fleet be able
to offer the military? The current U.S. merchant fleet is
undergoing a revolution brought about by containerization.
A proliferation of specialized ship types in the 1970s caused
a number of changes in the world shipping industry. One ma-
jor impact was specialization and the trend toward contain-
erization of cargo. More and more ships are now designed to
carry a specific cargo, such as vehicles, or cargo that is
transported in uniform units, such as containers. The in-
troduction of these containers carried by containerships has
completely changed the composition of the U.S. merchant
fleet and transformed the general cargo business. The fleet
is expected to increase its number of containerships while
the number of break-bulk, ships will continue to decrease.
By the year 2005, it is anticipated that almost all commer-
cial shipping will be containerized [Ref. 26:p. 7].
A container, in our specialized sense, is just a big
metal box, 20 or 40 feet long by 8 feet high by 8 feet wide.
This uniformity of the container has made it possible to
ship containerized cargo over land, sea, and air routes
from origin to destination with less handling time and less
damage or pilferage of goods. By increasing cargo handling
speed containerization had made it economically possible to
use large ships. An actual decrease in port time required
for loading and discharging has resulted despite increased
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increased loads. These larger ships are also viewed as the
ones that will have the most to gain from the advancement
of nuclear propulsion. The time and money savings available
have led to a great acceptance of containerization over re-
cent years and increased interest in their future utilization,
[Ref. 26:pp. 60-61]
A study on the future of containerized shipping conduct-
ed by the Trade Research and Analysis Section of the New
York Port Authority showed that, "Clearly a large potential
world market for container shipments exists." As more and
more ports become equipped to handle the larger container
ships and their specialized load the increase in containeri-
zation will continue. The Port Authority study categorized
cargo into four major groups according to their susceptibil-
ity to container handling:
1. Prime
Prime commodities are generally of high value and
high shipping rates with physical characteristics
which permit them to be efficiently packed in con-
tainers. Many commodities in the prime category
are highly susceptable to damage or pilferage.
Examples of prime containerized cargoes are liquors
and wines, pharmaceuticals, and non-bulky machinery.
2. Suitable
Suitable commodities are generally of moderate value
whose shipping rates are less than those for prime
commodities. These commodities have only a modest
susceptibility to damage or pilferage. Examples of
suitable containerization cargoes are wood shingles,




Marginal commodities are of low value with low shipping
rates but can be physically placed in containers. They
have little susceptibility to damage or pilferage and
may be difficult to containerize because of size,
weight, or other packaging problems. Examples of mar-
ginal commodities are steel ignots, pig iron, and
unmanufactured wood.
4. Unsuitable
Unsuitable cargoes generally cannot be physically
placed in a container or are more efficiently carried
in a specialized vessel (vehicle vessel). Examples
of cargo unsuitable for containerization are scrap
iron, large trucks or vehicles, and items of over 40
feet in length or eight feet in width [Ref. 15:p. 6-6],
While some military cargo could be classified in the
prime or suitable categories, the major portion of military
cargo is oversized and falls into the marginal or unsuitable
categories. Containerships are specifically designed to
carry containers stacked in cells within the ship. This
system alleviates the need to pack, brace, deck, top, and
otherwise support the cargo in the holes. Ships are loaded
by lifting the containers aboard and placing them in the
appropriate cell. Although lacking the flexibility to carry
out-sized cargo, these ships make up in volume and handling
speed what they may lack in adaptability.
Containerships are classified into two general categor-
ies: self-sustaining and non-self-sustaining. A main ad-
vantage of the self-sustaining ship is its ability to load
and discharge its cargo by means of a gantry crane or other
on ship lifting equipment. For this reason it is not depen-
dent upon shore lifting facilities and has the option of
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being able to service more ports. The non-self-sustaining
ship, however, lacks an on board lifting capability, and it
is therefore completely dependent on external or port located
cranes for loading or discharge.
The self-sustaining containership was predominate in the
early phases of containership construction and would have
served a more useful military purpose. As containerization
became more popular, major ports were redesignated into
elaborate container ports with giant container cranes. Thus,
the need for the more expensively constructed self -container-
ship has decreased to the point that all containerships now
under construction in the United States are of the non-self-
sustaining type [Ref. 28:p. 5].
D. UNPREDICTABLE EVENTS
Unpredictable events such as oil price "shocks," polit-
ically motivated actions, and unpredicted technological in-
novations have the ability to impact dramatically on the
future of ocean shipping. The most recent example of an
unpredictable event is the sudden decline in oil prices in
the mid 1980s.
Only five years ago the proliferation of "super tankers"
to more economically transport the expensive commodity of
oil was being predicted. Now, with the low pricing of oil
making such an investment unprofitable, tankers of all sizes
are lying empty in prots or being sold for scrap iron. Con-
tainerization is predicted as the transportation mode of the
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future but, if a better and more economical method of packag-
ing and shipping is discovered, containerships could be sit-
ting idle in ports or being sold for scrap. The military
would need to remain flexible to unpredictable events to
some extent.
A technological advance in air travel which could allow
for larger loads to be carried more economically could to-
tally erase the need for ocean shipping. Air travel already
offers the speed which is affordable for smaller, light
weight, high value items. The advantage of ocean shipping
is its ability to offer cheap transportation for the heavier,
larger, low-value items.
Politically motivated shipping embargos have always hurt
the shipping industry. If the United States tries to exert
its influence over a greater portion of the world by using
trade restriction, the economy of the U.S., the strength of
the merchant fleet, and ultimately the defense of the coun-
try could be weakened. In light of current events, no pro-
jection of the future of shipping would be complete without
some mention of terrorism on the sea. There is little doubt
that the potential for increase in terrorism exists and that
this increase would negatively impact on the commercial
shipper. Terrorists have shown that they can have easy ac-
cess to ships and that they can cause great damage to per-
sonnel and cargo. Continued safe shipping depends on the
shipowner's ability to "sabatoge" and deflect the saboteur.
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Ships at port and certain ports are especially vulnerable
Depending on the political climate, certain ships and ports
become very attractive targets for terrorists. The writer
believes that, as U.S. policy (i.e., foreign policy and some
controversial aspects of domestic policy, such as environ-
mental practices) is perceived to be counter to the goals or
interests of certain groups, an increase in terrorism should
be anticipated.
Shippers could become hesistant to ship high-value or
hard-to-obtain commodities via ship and any progress made to
rebuild the U.S. Merchant Fleet could be negated. Cargo
would be shipped on "safer" ships of other nations and the
U.S. flag fleet which is vital to the economy and defense of
this country would only continue to decline.
E
. SUMMARY
To be able to fully utilize the merchant fleet of the
future the military must be aware of the possible composi-
tion of that fleet. The forecast of future trade increase
makes it profitable for the U.S. Merchant Fleet to research
and develop ways to become more competitive with the other
national fleets. Unfortunately, some of the most positive
changes from an economically competitive point of view ap-
pear to have a negative defense support aspect. Projections
profile a merchant fleet consisting of very large, nuclear
powered, containerships manned by a minimal number of crew.
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IV. IMPACT OF TRENDS ON MILITARY
SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS
A. INTRODUCTION
The impact of future trends on the merchant fleet affects
the fleet's ability to meet its military support requirements.
The U.S. Merchant Fleet serves as the "Fourth Arm of Defense,"
for the United States. It stands ready to integrate with
the Navy in times of conflict to protect U.S. interest over-
seas , and at the same time provide a continuing supply of
raw materials at home. The military has specific manpower
and ship support requirements which it relies on the merchant
fleet to fulfill. The composition of the merchant fleet can-
not change without effecting its ability to provide adequate
military support.
The changes in ship technology, size and type are al-
ready impacting on the fleet's ability to meet its military
support requirements. This chapter will examine and compare
the projected merchant fleet and projected military shipping
and manning requirements.
B. MANNING REQUIREMENTS
The U.S. Merchant Fleet supports the seafarer manpower
pool that must respond to wartime national defense require-
ments. Figure 1 shows the increasing number of merchant






















































be required to man the Ready Reserve Force if it is acti-
vated. The number levels off to 9,396 in 1991 when the
number of ships to be added to the Ready Reserve Force
reaches its goal of 116 vessels. Tables II and III present
the breakdown of those requirements.
The Ready Reserve Force (RRF) is a fleet of government-
owned, laid-up ships which would be activated to provide
military cargo shipping support in times of emergency. Most
of the RRF ships are located at one of three sites--James
River, Virginia; Beaumont, Texas; Suisun Bay, California.
Present plans are that those ships with ten- and twenty-day
readiness requirements will remain in these locations.
Those RRF ships with five-day readiness requirements will be
relocated near loadout ports. By spreading the ships out,
manning requirements are spread over a wider area of respon-
sibility. Hopefully, there would be a better chance that
the local unions will be able to provide adequate manpower
within the prescribed time windows.
Advances in the technology which allows for fewer crew
members onboard a commercial shipping vessel do not apply
for RRF vessels because of the way the vessels are obtained.
All ships in the RRF are obtained from the U.S. maritime
industry. As the industry switches to newer ships the ships
that are to be retired but still have a useful life are ob-
tained for the RRF. The average age of the ships is 24.8
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NUMBER OF LICENSED SEAMEN REQUIRED TO FULLY MAN
EACH DEPARTMENT OF READY RESERVE FORCE SHIPS
(1984-1995)
Number of Licensed Seamen
Number Deck Engineering Radio
Year of Ships Officer Officer Officer
1984 55 274 336 54
1985 73 364 456 77
1986 87 435 539 92
1987 93 464 571 97
1988 101 504 620 111
1989 108 539 663 113
1990 112 559 688 117
1991 116 578 712 121
1192 116 578 712 121
1993 116 578 712 121
1994 116 578 712 121
1995 116 578 712 121
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime
Administration, Office of Maritime Labor
and Training, "Reserve Fleet Crewing Feasibility
1984-1995,", p. 21.
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The manning requirements predicted for military support
must take into consideration how the trends in advanced
technology will contribute to a reduction in the number of
personnel available. The trends in crew reduction are ex-
pected to continue based on the economic advantages and
operational efficiency that they afford. Although the ship-
ping industry is still far away from the unmanned "slave"
ship described in Chapter III the number of billets available
to the merchant mariner are decreasing at a steady rate.
A distinction must be made at this point between "billets
available" and "manpower requirements." A billet is the
actual job position which is available or required to be
filled. Manpower requirements are the number of people re-
quired to fill the billet. The labor supply ratio allows
for two mariners to fill every one billet (this provides
for vacation time, training time, and transit time to and
from the ships). Therefore, the manpower requirements of a
ship with twenty billets is forty people. The deletion of
one of these billets results in two mariners being unable
to find employment. The unemployed mariner begins to lag
behind in ship time and training while waiting for another
billet to open. Many mariners have quit viewing the mer-
chant marines as a viable career and have changed professions
entirely thus becoming totally unavailable to the maritime
manpower pool in time of emergency.
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Table IV presents the typical U.S. Merchant Shipboard
Organization. By tradition, U.S. flag vessels are organized
into three departments: deck, engineering, and steward.
The manning level of the ship is usually a function of the
class and technology of the ship and the type of service it
provides. Technological innovations in the bridge and a
remote sensor alarm to monitor engine operating conditions.
These innovations remove the requirement for around the
clock watch standers in the engine room. As this remote
sensor watch is installed in more and more ships, the re-
quirement of having enough unlicensed engine-room personnel
to have three per watch can be deleted.
The trend towards instrumentation process control and
on line monitoring systems for navigation, will enable
large reductions in the size of the shipboard maintenance
force. The monitoring systems can identify potential
equipment problems that can be repaired while the ship is
in port. This reduces the need for large numbers of skilled
repair personnel at sea [Ref. 21:pp. 1-11], The positions
of carpenters, electricians, reefer specialists, water tend-
ers and oilers could be affected.
The number of seagoing billets on U.S. flag ships fell
from 168,000 after World War II to just 19,000 in 1984
[Ref. 31]. It is anticipated that advancements in tech-
nology combined with a decrease in the number of merchant
ships will continue to decrease the number of jobs available
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TABLE IV
U.S. MERCHANT SHIPBOARD ORGANIZATION
Ship's Master


























The Ship's Purser, Chief Steward, and Radio Officer are
all unlicensed Staff Officers also attached to the ship.
Source: Derived from lecture at the Navy School of Physical
Distribution Management, 1985.
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in the merchant marine force by 4% every year. Previous
estimates of the active workforce expected to be available
by 1990 were 31,000 people [Ref. 33:p. 9]. Taking into
account the increased technology that will allow for re-
duced manning and result in a further decline of jobs avail-
able, Figure 2 shows a projected number of merchant mariners
available through the year 1994. In this projection the
available 1990 number is 3000.
If the RRF is activated, commercial shipping will con-
tinue to function and the commercial ship operators will
compete with the RRF ships for available manpower. Assum-
ing that the average 4% annual decline in the number of
seagoing billets available continues, by 1990, there will
be 13,819 commercial billets that need to be filled. Using
the labor supply ratio of 2:1 there will be a need for
27,636 seamen to fill the billets available. If the pre-
dicted workforce of 30,000 is actually available there will
be adequate manpower for commercial shipping. With the
activation of the Ready Reserve Force there will be a mini-
mal requirement of 9,094 men to fill the 4,547 (2:1 ratio)
additional billets. The result will be a shortfall of at
least 6,730 sailors.
Using data from the 1984 MARAD combined with the data
in Tables III and IV, Figure 3 shows the projected number
of personnel available, personnel required for commercial
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Reserve Force beginning in 1986 and projected to the year
2000. In time of peace a sufficient number of mariners
will be available to fill commercial billets. In time of
a national emergency, the manning gap increases to almost
10,000 by the year 2000.
C. SHIPPING REQUIREMENTS
From the standpoint of national security, one needs to
make an important distinction between what is commercially
economic and efficient, and what is militarily useful.
Economic efficiency is and will continue to be the primary
consideration of any private commercial shipping enterprise
in the competitive shipping market. The larger specialized
commercial ship offers this economic efficiency. With the
increasing numbers of larger non-self-sustaining container-
ships the gap between commercially efficient vessels and
those that are militarily useful is growing wider. Table
V presents the characteristics of the most militarily use-
ful ships and the corresponding projections of the
characteristics.
TABLE V SHIP CHARACTERISTICS
Militarily Useful_Ship 5!yty£?_§!}iP
a. Relatively small: a. Increasing in size:
may use small harbors requires larger harbors.
b. Flexible: able to carry b. Specialized: container-
a variety of cargoes ships or specific cargo
c. Self-sustaining; able c. Non-self-sustaining; re-
to load and off-load quires mechanized port
cargo without special- facilities to load and
ized shore facilities. off-load.
[Ref. 5:p. 32]
49
The characteristics that are most useful to the military
allow for ships that can adapt to whatever type of cargo the
military would ship and be able to utilize the smaller ports
which might be more strategically located. Smaller ships
would be able to move in closer to the shore, if no port
facilities at all are available, and could offer alternative
near shore off-loading options. The ability to load and
off-load independent of what port facilities are available
can be invaluable in providing immediate cargo availability.
Table VI shows the results of a recent assessment of
militarily useful vessels owned by U.S. companies.
TABLE VI
MILITARILY USEFUL SHIPS IN THE U.S. OWNED FLEET;
OCEANGOING SHIPS OF 1,000 GROSS TONS AND OVER
AS OF JANUARY 1, 1984
Category Total Ships Military Useful Ships
U.S. Flag
Active Fleet 439 294
Inactive 349 325
Subtotal 788 619
Registered Abroad 602 * 84
Total, U.S. Owned Fleet 1,390 703
*As of January 1, 1983
SOURCE: Maritime Administration and Navy Department
These figures indicate that only about two-thirds of
active U.S. flag ships are readily useful for military sup-
port. Among U.S. owned registered abroad only 14% are con-
sidered militarily useful.
50
The first major problem facing the military is the dif-
ficulty in effectively utilizing the larger containerized
vessel of the future in the initial stages of a deployment
to underdeveloped areas. The nonavailability of cargo hand-
ling equipment or large port facilities in such situations
has resulted in a great deal of evaluation and hard work on
the part of the Navy. The movement from ship-to-shore of
cargo has always been difficult and time consuming. The
size of the cargo and vessels initially needed in case of
mobilization generally fall into "unsuitable" for contain-
erization category stated in Chapter III. For the cargo
that could be containerized the mechanized cargo handling
equipment would only be available in the more major ports.
The Navy has recently conducted exercises in "Over-the-
Shore-Discharge-of-Containership" (OSDOC), and "Container
Off -Loading and Transfer System" (COTS). These present
exercises should provide tomorrow's methods in ocean
transportation.
Another problem of military utilization of container-
ships is the difficulty of expediously mobilizing and then
accumulating the required ships at the locations needed to
transport military sealift cargo. Containerships must be
in constant service to take advantage of their high ton-
mile capacities. They service highly productive routes.
Just to assemble the vessels would cause logistical prob-




A threat to the national defense of the United States
exists in the merchant fleet's inability to perform its
manning and cargo shipment support programs. This threat
is projected to increase steadily as the gap between what
is required of the fleet and what is available from the
fleet increases. The number of mariners available to man
the Ready Reserve Force is extremely inadequate. The num-
ber of militarily useful ships is also at a dangerously low
level. Additional numbers of commercial ships which will
be of little military use are expected to dominate the fu-
ture commercial fleet. Alternatives to provide adequate
manning and shipping should be explored by the military.
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V. PRESENTATION OF ALTERNATIVES
A. MANPOWER ALTERNATIVES
As seen in the last chapter, manpower shortages are
projected to increase. Several alternatives may help re-
solve the maritime manpower shortages likely to occur dur-
ing a full activation of the RRF. Those alternatives are
discussed below.
1. Merchant Marine Militarized
The option of whether or not to accept employment
aboard a ship lies with the merchant mariner. During WW II
the decision of mariners not to go back to sea created seri-
ous manpower shortages for the British. The British Govern-
ment reacted with a measure that militarized the merchant
marine and forced seamen to go back to sea. This measure
helped alleviate much of the British manpower shortage prob-
lem for the remainder of the war.
How much of the manpower shortage experienced dur-
ing the Vietnam Conflict was attributed to seamen choosing
not to go to sea has also been a question [Ref. 32:p. 29].
When the RRF is activated, there is the possibility of an
artificial manpower shortage because of the reluctance on
the part of merchant mariners to support the mission of
the RRF ships. One way to avoid this type of shortage and
insure that every available mariner is utilized if needed
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is to militarize the merchant marine during time of
emergency.
The militarization of the merchant marine would
force seamen to return to sea. This would remove the right
of free choice from one segment of the population simply
because of its profession. The risks to merchant mariners
in a wartime scenario are often greater than those faced
by military vessels because merchant ships and Ready Reserve
Force ships are not armed. Forcing people in civilian sta-
tus into the position of an unarmed soldier would be the
main effect of this measure and could carry great social
costs.
Militarizing the merchant marine was investigated
by Congress during the manpower shortages of WW II. No bill
was ever passed because the problem was alleviated by pay-
ment of war bonuses and higher wages for merchant mariners.
The maritime manpower shortages that occurred during Korea
and Vietnam did not raise the question of militarization of
the merchant marine to solve the problem. There is no his-
torical precedent for this alternative in the United States
and its constitutionality could be questioned.
2. Draft Deferment
The RRF will require unskilled, unlicensed - entry
level personnel to man the ships as they are initially ac-
tivated. Most entry level personnel are between the ages
of 18 and 25. If a draft were activated these are the
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people who would be drafted first and taken from the mari-
time labor force. Drafting these people would contribute
to a critical manpower shortage for the RRF ships. Allow-
ing these people to remain in the industry in draft defer-
ment status or to enter the merchant marine instead of
entering military service would ensure fewer delayed or
shorthanded RRF sailings.
The Selective Service System allowed merchant ma-
rine draft deferments for those skills that were in short
supply during the Vietnam Conflict. While this action did
not induce a large number of people to join the maritime
workforce, it did provide some relief for the merchant ma-
rine [Ref. 32:p. 29]. The historical precedent allows for
this to be a reasonably possible alternative to activate to
meet future requirements.
3 . Contract Manning
The Navy is currently contracting for civilian
crews to man some of the classes of ships used for support
missions. This preserves jobs in the industry to keep a
stable workforce and frees uniformed sailors to man the new
600 ship Navy. The Navy could expand this policy to include
ammunition ships (AE), combat stores ships (AFS), and de-
stroyer tenders (AD).
There are disadvantages to this alternative. Civil-
ian manning contracts that have been initiated have not been
without their problems. Security clearances are required
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for civilians on classified vessels or on classified mis-
sions. After receiving costly security checks, merchant
seamen are not presented from simply walking off the job be-
fore a vessel is to leave. There are no laws that force
merchant seamen to go to sea if they choose not to go and
the mission may be delayed.
This support training available on these support
ships would eventually be lost to uniformed personnel if
all support crews were contracted out. The advantages
gained for the increased number of billets opened up to the
mariners appear to be far outweighed by the possible
disadvantages
.
B. SHIP REQUIREMENT ALTERNATIVES
The previous chapter also shows the projected gap grow-
ing between commercial ships available and militarily use-
ful ships required in event of mobilization. Several
alternatives are available to prevent this shortage.
1 . Direct Government Procurement of Ships
This option is very attractive because it allows
for providing exactly the numbers and types of ships re-
quired to support the nation's strategic sealift require-
ments. The Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as amended in 1981,
authorizes this type of procurement. These ships would be
built to military specifications but could be used to carry
commercial freight during peacetime.
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The U.S. maritime industries have been in a contin-
ual state of decline since well before the turn of the cen-
tury except for periods immediately following WW I and WW II.
During those wars, massive shipbuilding was responsible for
reestablishing the U.S. Merchant Marine. In fact, direct
procurement has been the only successful means found in this
century for stimulating U.S. merchant shipping [Ref. 5:p. 77]
This would be a very expensive alternative. Under current
budget constraints it is doubtful that such a shipbuilding
effort would be authorized. The current Administration is
facing difficulty in the building of "defense required"
without having to fight for the ships that would support
these ships. Historical perspective has shown, however,
that this alternative is the most likely to be activated if
the need arises.
2 . Adaptation to Available Commercial Resources
Maximize the use of containers whenever possible,
economical, reliable, and responsive to military sealift
needs. Continued research and fleet exercises must be ac-
complished to develop alternative systems of carrying and
discharging containerized cargo.
Military ports should continue to be adapted for
the larger ships and the necessary cargo loading and un-
loading systems. The military should conduct research into
the development of mobile terminal facilities that would
allow for the loading or unloading of cargo under any
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circumstances from the commercial ships available in the fu-
ture. The RRF ships must be kept in sufficient numbers to
carry the military cargo which is unsuitable for container-
ization. This alternative would require the cooperation of
both commercial and military shippers.
3 . Increased Cooperation
The United States does not have a coordinated civil-
ian and military shipping program. It is unique among mari-
time nations in the number and fragmentation of organizations
representing ship operators and government maritime interests.
In many of the major successful maritime nations, a single
organization represents ship operating companies and one or
two national maritime unions represents labor concerns.
Part of the national strategy includes a collaborative mari-
time research program [Ref. 33:p. 1].
Cooperative efforts should be made towards obtain-
ing ships that will add to the competitive commercial ship-
ping of the U.S. and still offer better options for defense
planners. The strengthening of decks, for example, in fu-
ture commercial ships could allow for their conversion to
militarily useful ships which could carry heavier military
vehicles. The possibility of offering government building
subsidies for ships which meet certain specifications should
be discussed.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
Future trends in ship technology, size, and type will
have a negative impact on the merchant fleet's ability to
perform its military support requirements. By the year
2000 it is projected that the manning gap will have widened
to an extremely threatening level. Increasing advances in
technology will continue to make reduction in the size of
commercial crews possible. Future ship size and type will
not meet military requirements without adaptation of either
the ship or the military cargo to be transported. The mer-
chant fleet of the future will consist of ships which do
not meet many of the military ship type requirements. The
most militarily useful ships are small, self-contained, and
flexible; the opposite of the large, non-self contained,
specialized container vessel which is expected to dominate
the fleet by the turn of the century.
While military studies have looked at military require-
ments, these requirements should be looked at in relation
to the anticipated changes in the commercial shipping in-
dustry. The commercial shipping trends are necessary for
the survival of the fleet and are expected to continue past
the turn of the century. With these trends continuing, the
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gaps in manning and shipping will continue to grow if action
is not taken. Several options are available to prevent the
manning and shipping shortage.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Several alternatives presented in the previous chapter
deserve further study. One conclusion appears to be ob-
vious: to bring the merchant fleet back to the forefront of
world fleets, able to support the U.S. in both peace and war,
a combined maritime and defense effort must be made. This
study recommends that several areas especially warrant fur-
ther study.
1. The U.S. should establish one central coordinating
program for commercial and government maritime in-
terest. The goals of maintaining a competitive
merchant fleet that can meet certain military speci-
fications need not be mutually exclusive if com-
munication and coordination is emphasized.
2. If conditions require a reinstatement of the draft,
draft deferment programs should be established and
utilized for personnel in or joining the merchant
marine.
3. The direct government procurement of ships to meet
the needs not met by the commercial fleet should
be established. It is allowed for by law and could
serve to stimulate the U.S. shipbuilding industry.
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